

Assessment Report
Displaced Children and Orphans Program
in Lebanon

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We have been displaced twice: the first time during the war, when we were kids; the second time, when they dragged us back to this empty village.

Mr. Joseph Tikle a recent returnee to the village of Majdel Moush, in the Chouf

Half the children in these institutions could be living at home, comfortably, without subsidy. They go to institutions because this is the only way they can get an education. Solve the education problem, and you solve the orphanage problem.

USAID is spreading the butter too thinly. Impact? what impact?

Mr. John J. G. Etre, National Council for Social Welfare Services

The problems of NGOs are identical to the problems of governmental agencies: both suffer from poor leadership, poor management, poor analysis, and poor delivery, and both are dominated by the personal agenda of those at the top.

Ms. Lina Abu Habib, Coordinator, OXFAM, UK

Let me tell you a secret about us. Lebanese people are the shortest-term thinkers on the planet.

If you put your sugar in the sea, you will lose your sugar, and the sea will never taste sweet.

Mr. Mohammad Barakat, President, National Council for Social Welfare Institutions

Executive Summary

The following are the main conclusions of an assessment of the Displaced Children and Orphans Program in Lebanon, conducted January 27, 1997 through February 7, 1997.

- C *The World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) formula works well.* WRF has skillfully targeted and managed Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF) resources and has had some impact at a variety of levels. The WRF has taken a unique path, and the benefits of its approach are beginning to yield results. If the WRF were instead to support non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) that were strictly nonsectarian and nonaffiliated politically, it would have very little room to maneuver.

- C *The butter is spread thin.* Through its partnership with WRF, DCOF has ensured that funding has reached an appropriately broad range of organizations and constituencies within the fractured Lebanese political and confessional culture. The opportunity now exists to optimize its impact by focusing funding on fewer projects while maintaining the current multi confessional, countrywide program.

- C *The range of unmet needs of at-risk children is large and diverse, and, there is no single, overriding issue.* There is a plethora of anecdotal information but a paucity of hard data about the needs of vulnerable children. At both the policy-making and operational levels, there is a widespread lack of capacity and willingness to address this problem. Government policy with regard to social service priorities is incoherent at best.

- C *USAID's strategic objectives for Lebanon make solid, pragmatic sense and offer new opportunities to optimize the DCOF 's impact.* USAID investment is being significantly increased over that for 1996. The four special objectives within the three agency goals are compatible with the realities of Lebanon today and offer the DCOF a promising framework for ongoing investment. A continuing partnership between the DCOF and the WRF would offer opportunities to optimize the leverage effect of DCOF funds at the policy and systemic level as well as the operational level.

- C *The WRF needs to strengthen its capacity to report on impact.* The WRF is not reporting on impact in a manner that will satisfy donors in the longer term. Improvements will be difficult but are achievable.

- C *The NGO sector is divided and ruled.* The NGO "community" is poorly served by the coordination agencies and other groupings that purport to serve its interests. The NGO sector is weak, fractured, divided, and without the influence it merits-- despite its own good opinion of itself and the government*s verbal tokens of appreciation. It plays little or no role in the design or development of social policy. Opportunities exist for the DCOF to exert some influence in this area, if it continues its partnership with the WRF.

- C *The government sector is divided and misruled.* Government departments work in uncoordinated empires of influence, and social service delivery policies are made by a variety of ministries. The result is waste and inefficiency. The WRF, through its participation in numerous committees, has the potential to influence policy, planning, and implementation.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made for increasing the impact of the DCOF resources in Lebanon.

- C *Stay in place.* The DCOF should give serious consideration to maintaining and increasing its investment in Lebanon.
- C *Stay with a winner.* The WRF offers organizational and operational credibility, strategic coherence, and a proven relationship of trust.
- C *Integrate more closely into the USAID country strategy.* The DCOF could maximize the benefits of its funding by integrating its funding policy more closely with developing USAID policy in Lebanon.
- C *Focus more effectively.* The DCOF could have a stronger impact by focusing on fewer project activities in more targeted geographical areas. If such a sharpened focus were coupled with a more integrated approach to programming with other USAID-funded NGOs, the benefits to all parties would be increased measurably.
- C *Support action research.* The DCOF could commission a detailed study of the unmet needs of Lebanon's most vulnerable children. The WRF could supervise implementation of such a study and participate in its design. The DCOF could also commission a report on legislation that applies to children and families. Finally, the DCOF could also consider awarding more funding to the WRF's program of collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs to leverage systemic change.
- C *Limit the spread of activities, but spread the butter thicker.* The WRF should consider limiting its investment to a more targeted scope of work, with more measurable impact potential. This should be planned in such a way as to harmonize with overall USAID policy for Lebanon and should maintain sufficient geographical spread to consolidate the WRF's image as a nonsectarian organization. The WRF should continue to balance its support for meeting the material needs of vulnerable children while building on its "political" agenda of seeking to affect child care policy at an institutional and government level.

- Ⓒ *Require USAID-funded NGOs to integrate their programming.* Just as there are benefits to be realized through closer coordination between the DCOF and the USAID Mission, so are there benefits from collaboration by USAID-funded NGOs. USAID should require U.S. NGOs and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in Lebanon to integrate their programs in order to increase their impact.

- Ⓒ *Improve the WRF's capacity to document the impact of its work.* The WRF needs help from USAID to develop an effective monitoring system that meets the needs of its donor. Although, assessing changes in attitude and behavior is a complex task, the WRF would strengthen its case for ongoing funding if such an effort were made.

Lessons Learned and Proposals

The WRF is a serious organization, run by committed, competent professionals. Its reputation for integrity is broadly known and the foundation of its continuing success. However, the WRF is trying to achieve too much with too little.

According to the WRF's October 1996 progress report, most grants to subgrantees average about \$3,100 and 153 grants were made between November 1, 1996, and September 30, 1997. The time, effort, and cost to assess, monitor, evaluate, and control such a large number of subgrants is considerable. Moreover, such an approach does not seem viable if funding is reduced.

Three options are available to the DCOF:

- C Withdraw from Lebanon.
- C Increase funding to maintain the current breadth of activities.
- C Reduce the funding level and focus on one or more areas of unmet need.

The WRF has generally honored its commitment to the DCOF in its delivery of the agreed program. But alternatives to institutional care are not emerging, and it will take years to negotiate real systemic change. No mechanisms are in place at a national or regional level to address the de-institutionalization of children, and the WRF has not had a significant influence on the advancement of alternative models. We cannot realistically expect one U.S. NGO to have achieved much more than putting the issue on the table, as the WRF has done.

Proposal for a Three-Track Approach

Within USAID's selected geographical areas of priority, and broadly within the parameters of the three agency goals, the DCOF could invest according to the following three-track approach:

- C Increased funding to projects that deliver rapid benefits to disadvantaged children. This would mean fewer projects would be funded; funding of infrastructure improvements would end; and investment would be made only in innovative methods focusing on child development and reintegration, alternatives to institutional care, and a return to family life. An action research project on street children would be part of this approach.

- Ⓒ Enhanced capacity-strengthening for subgrantee service delivery agencies. This would entail more input for project planning, monitoring, fundraising, advocacy, and networking. Funding ‘leverage* would continue.
- Ⓒ Increased investment in support for national committees and advocacy groups. This would entail more investment in the national committees on social issues and education and in developing the capacity of the Ministry of Social Affairs. A study could be commissioned on all laws pertaining to children, with recommendations for change.

What seems to be missing from the USAID Strategic Objectives and Goals is an attempt to influence change in policy on child care and welfare issues. The DCOF, through the WRF, could integrate this approach through USAID Special Objective 2 (increased effectiveness of selected democratic institutions).

Integration of the Work of NGOs

There is little coordination between U.S. NGOs, for example, between Save the Children USA and Caritas/CRS, which are both involved in micro-enterprise development projects funded by USAID. I propose a much closer partnership between USAID-funded NGOs to optimize both impact and value for taxpayer dollars.

If USAID/Lebanon insisted on joint planning and project design for all its U.S. NGO partners, each organization could take responsibility for a particular sector of need yet implementation would be integrated into an overall and wider goal. Thus, the economic benefits of micro-credit schemes, for example, could be closely integrated into a sister agency*s project on health, education, or the de-institutionalization and reintegration of children.

There are several reasons why the U.S. NGOs working in Lebanon might be receptive to this proposal:

- Ⓒ The funding crisis in Lebanon is compelling all NGOs to rethink their presence in the country. This proposal offers a lower-cost reason to stay in place, rather than leave.
- Ⓒ The arguments in favor of jointly operated programs are far more compelling than those against.
- Ⓒ Impact indicators could be standardized across the spectrum of USAID- funded projects, thus simplifying reporting procedures.
- Ⓒ Some services (for example data-gathering methodology, capacity development for NGOs) could be pooled, thus saving human and financial resources.

Background

Lebanon's social institutions are weak, its politics tribal and confessional. Politically, Lebanon is a Syrian satellite. Human rights are routinely and systematically ignored, and children are jailed for misdemeanors. The notion of civil society is fragile and marginalized by the priorities of a government run by one of the world's wealthiest and most successful property developers.

The ability of NGOs to help the Lebanese people is compromised by the lack of meaningful cooperation. Three agencies of NGO coordination vie for precedence and have great contempt for each other. As long as this spirit of tribalism continues, NGOs will continue to occupy a weak position in Lebanese civil society and to have little impact on social policy debate or direction.

Worse perhaps, few NGOs are genuinely interested in the empowerment of their beneficiary constituencies. The Christian-dominated agencies tend to a rather 19th-century, charitable inclination; their Islamic counterparts tend toward a similarly traditional, paternalistic interpretation. The notion of the empowerment of the individual in Lebanon is as alien as it is in the former communist countries, but not because of an inheritance of socialism. In Lebanon's case, it is because the notion of the individual is subsumed in family, village, and tribe.

The government is at best suspicious of NGOs and at worst, hostile. NGOs are perceived as a political phenomenon in which trade unions, subversives, and other dangerous, antisocial forces share equal status.

The roots of Lebanon's civil war are still deeply implanted in the fabric of its social structures. Glossy new Beirut is the Middle Eastern equivalent of the Potemkin village. An orgy of rebuilding will not disguise the fact that the country's economic fabric has disintegrated. A small minority of super rich control most of the economy. A growing mass of uneducated poor have displaced the pre-war middle class. The political spoils are divided among the factions who led the destruction of the country.

But Lebanon is not Bosnia. A strong state and a strong leadership never prevailed here. Lebanon is a country of highly individualistic, entrepreneurial, hard-working people. Denial is the mechanism they use to relegate 17 years of war to only a footnote in daily conversation. Indeed, the Lebanese people must focus on the here and now and on earning a meager living. The minimum wage in Lebanon is \$250 a month. Yet, government figures indicate that it costs \$825 to feed a family of five for a month, without taking into account clothing, education, health, or housing.

Upwards of 200 residential care facilities accommodate some 36,000 children and young people in Lebanon. Although foreigners to call these institutions Orphanages, no more than 10 to 15 percent of the children in these institutions are probably orphans. There are no accurate figures to indicate how many of these children have lost both parents. Some of these institutions are run by religious foundations and offer reasonably good, traditional care models. Their charity is visible, and visible charity brings prestige and other benefits in the Lebanese context. They are not about to give up the golden goose. Other institutions are run as for-profit businesses by proprietors who massage attendance figures to extract maximum subsidies from the government. Many are humanitarian ego extensions of wealthy philanthropists. Only 120 of these institutions are officially registered.

The absence of any agreed child care policy or national plan, and the lack of an adequate governmental social service structure, coupled with increasing poverty and the power of vested interests, exacerbate's the hemorrhage of poor children into institutional care. The Ministry of Social Affairs is still struggling with the need to establish quality-control and monitoring systems and has no plans to establish an alternative system. We must assume that institutional care will remain a major factor in child care for the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, the government*s strategy for returnees--rebuilding village infrastructure-- has not brought families back from exile. Of the 70,000 families displaced by the civil war, 45,000 continue to live as illegal squatters and 12,000 live in "inhuman conditions", according to the Ministry of the Displaced.

Against this backdrop of poverty and suffering is a country whose government seeks to promote Lebanon as rising rapidly from the ashes of war. But the spectacular new buildings are only making it harder for NGOs to attract the interest of donors. UNICEF*s ambitious Master Plan still lacks the \$10 million needed for implementation. International NGOs are winding down or phasing out. Yet the government has allocated only 1.5 percent of the 1997 budget for the operations of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

The WRF and Its Work

The WRF injects funding into small projects, leveraging the funding to influence the approach its subgrantees take in working with children. By tying funding to subgrantees attendance at workshops it influences policy development and implementation. The WRF supports its subgrantees by investing in organizational capacity building. It also supports and encourages national committees that are trying to have a positive impact on child care and child development policy. Finally, the WRF lobbies for systemic change to child welfare policy.

The WRF supports projects of all the players in the Lebanese sectarian spectrum. For example, it has funded the purchase of equipment in a well-equipped residential facility run by the social service arm of a radical Shia Islamic group, just as it has funded similar projects in Maronite and Sunni institutions. The organization is not in the habit of providing funding to subgrantees that are not needy, but it does pay attention to political realities. WRF has gained a reputation for impartiality in an environment where impartiality is conspicuous by its absence.

Work with Client Partners

The funding and support relationship the WRF has forged with its partner agencies had the following aims and objectives:

- C Upgrade institutional care facilities
- C Raise public awareness about the needs of orphans and other institutionalized children
- C Modernize public, professional, and institutional processes relating to the welfare of orphans and other institutionalized children
- C Explore alternatives to current care methodology
- C Establish a national advisory committee in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs
- C Upgrade exchange opportunities between complementary agencies in child care
- C Support existing organizational frameworks focusing on quality care and operational standards for residential institutions working with older children
- C Upgrade the training of teachers, trainers, and other care workers in institutional care
- C Decrease the risk of harm to children living in residential care institutions
- C Launch an initiative focused on developing alternatives to institutional care, such as family placement and group homes
- C Network disabled children in residential care to related services, such as access to

prostheses

The WRF proposals were not very specific in terms of offering the DCOF impact indicators with regard to its investment. As stated earlier, WRF has work to do to satisfy its donor*s need for proven indicators of impact.

Impact on Client Partners

The funding and support relationship the WRF has forged with its partner agencies has had impact at several levels.

Children and families:

- C A significant change in the quality of life of all children served by partner agencies.
- C A perceptible change in attitudes toward the institutionalization of children.

Political:

- C Both the governmental and NGO sectors know that the WRF is non affiliated, which has freed the WRF from accusations of partiality, enhanced its acceptability, and increased its influence and impact at all levels.

NGOs and CBOs:

- C Funding and materials have enhanced project viability in the short term and impacted directly on the lives of children.
- C Participation in project design has strengthened organizational capacity.
- C Ongoing mentoring has enhanced project execution and management and contributed to longer-term planning.
- C Monitoring has strengthened client organizations* capacity to satisfy funders and to evaluate performance.
- C Participation in conferences and seminars has created awareness of other NGO programs and activities and enhanced networking between client organizations.
- C Concepts of care have been challenged and in some cases changed. (One organization, for example, now works with disabled and able-bodied children in an integrated way as a direct result of its ongoing relationship with the WRF.)
- C Less funding is requested from client organizations for traditional, infrastructure improvements and more funding for innovative and enhanced activity programs.
- C Management and administration of residential facilities have improved.

Government agencies:

- C The WRF's reputation for impartiality has opened governmental doors at all levels.
- C The Ministry of Social Affairs is more willing to include NGOs in discussions about child care policy, and the WRF has easy access to key players at the ministry.
- C Work to bring key players together to put pressure on government for systemic change has begun.

Unmet Needs

Before listing the unmet or inadequately met needs of Lebanese children, some comments about the social and political context are appropriate. First, there is no real social policy. A myriad of conflicting laws pertaining to children and the family are causing confusion between government departments, inertia at an operational level, and needless suffering for children. As discussed earlier, NGOs are weak, sectarian, and fractured. Most focus on inappropriate models of charitable assistance and function as humanitarian relics of the war. Local NGOs tend to be weak organizationally, handicapped by a funder-dependent mentality, and very weak in their fundraising capacity. International NGOs tend to be more service-deliverers for their own governments' aid policy than masters of their own course. Government perceives NGOs as only incidental players on the rehabilitation scene. Finally, both government and NGO social initiatives are operated in an uncoordinated way.

Against this backdrop a number of pressing needs must be addressed:

- C Access to education for all.
- C Education for children with special needs.
- C Legal reform and establishment of the rule of law.
- C Children's rights legislation.
- C Women's rights legislation.
- C Prevention of abandonment.
- C National training standards for residential child care professionals.
- C Social and economic redevelopment of village structures.
- C Small-scale business development and employment generation.
- C Economic opportunities for impoverished families and returnee children and families.
- C Alternatives to institutional care.

Lack of progress in all of the above areas is contributing to the following phenomena:

- C Needlessly institutionalized children.
- C Children on the street.
- C Working children.
- C Lack of education and rehabilitation for disabled children and children with special needs.
- C Imprisoned children.
- C "Delinquent" (and "drop-out") children.
- C Abuse within the family.

Although all of these issues are being addressed to some extent by NGOs, government agencies and other statutory bodies, none is being addressed in a coordinated manner. On the contrary, resources are wasted, conflicting care models are operating simultaneously, and intersectoral cooperation is virtually nonexistent.

It should be noted that although this information was gathered from a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental sources, data to verify these claims are scarce.

Priority Policy and Systemic Issues

The following issues must be addressed if ongoing funding to child-based NGOs is to have better than marginal results:

- C The legal status of children and the family and the rights of the child.
- C The development of a social policy on family and child welfare.
- C A policy on alternatives to institutional and punitive care for children.
- C A policy on minimum standards of care in state-approved child-care institutions.
- C The registration of all residential institutions for children.
- C Clarity on the law as it pertains to NGOs.
- C The role of NGOs in service delivery.
- C Investment in the social, economic, and educational facilities of war-damaged communities.
- C Investment in the state education system and access by all children to schooling of a reasonable standard.

The Future of Child-based NGOs

Lebanese child-based NGOs must either adapt or die. Those that can grasp the development nettle may survive, but even for them the challenges will demand enormous efforts. The traditional, charitable agencies will continue as long as national donor consciousness remains fixated on charity as a cheap ticket to Islamic paradise or a traditional Christian method of comforting themselves that "the (grateful) poor will be with us always". With some exceptions, these agencies will perforce continue as small-scale personality cults rather than as tools for the empowerment of the poor and disadvantaged. Cultural imperatives at both the donor and operator level mitigate against significant change in the medium term.

Many private organizations will perceive movement toward the establishment of alternatives to institutional care as a threat to their interests, and they may act as a break on progress.

If the Ministry of Social Affairs is able to develop a coherent child care policy, the NGOs will have an opportunity to become subsidized service providers for the government's social program. This may be an acceptable destiny for some NGOs. However, they should not fall prey to the belief that a service provider has genuine control over its own destiny. Many U.S. NGOs can attest to this fact.

This poor prognosis for NGOs will be aggravated as long as the three agencies of NGO "coordination" continue to snipe and stab each other in the back. There are no indications that this situation will change anytime soon.

In a secure society, NGOs are as much irritants to the status quo as they are part of it. The Lebanese state and Lebanese civil society are not secure enough to permit such organizations too much leeway. Meanwhile, continued investment by foreign, partner NGOs will help strengthen local capacity and expose NGOs to alternative functional models.

Annex 1

Scope of Work for Assessment of Displaced Children and Orphans Program in Lebanon

The purpose of the current assessment is twofold:

(1) First, the consultant will report on the relative impact that the WRF program has achieved during the period of USAID support; and second, he will report on the overall scope and scale of problems affecting war-affected, displaced, or unaccompanied children in Lebanon today, including street children.

(2) The primary objective of the assessment is to produce a report which might serve as the basis for a potential new initiative which would serve unmet needs of these children. However, given the nature of the assessment and the status of USAID programming plans for Lebanon, the consultant is cautioned to avoid raising any local expectations of additional funding or of potential new program direction.

(3) Both elements of the assessment should focus on the identification and application of specific indicators of impact, both with respect to WRF achievement to date as well as with respect to any potential future initiatives which might be identified.

(4) Given that most programs funded under DCOF are based upon the premise that institutionalization is the last option to be considered for unaccompanied children, the Lebanon program is by definition a special exceptional case insofar as the DCOF is concerned.

(5) Therefore, with respect to the WRF element of the assessment, the consultant should address the following issues:

(a) Describe the status of the situation of institutionalized and unaccompanied children at the beginning of the USAID program, and re-state the intended impact and benefits which WRF foresaw and proposed to achieve during the 'life of the project*' at that time.

(b) Describe, from the perspective of WRF, government representatives, cooperating WRF subgrantees and others in the child welfare community, the actual and perceived benefits and impact that the WRF program achieved.

(c) The assessment should address impact on improved well-being of displaced and unaccompanied children, as well as issues such as

- C policy change
- C advocacy
- C planning and coordination

- C data collection and utilization
- C organizational strengthening of subgrantees, including:
 - human resource development
 - quality of care and behavioral change in service providers and managers
 - financial sustainability
 - income and employment generation
 - strengthening capacity of families and community-based groups to address needs of displaced and unaccompanied children

(6) With respect to the portion of the assessment dealing with current and future needs, the consultant should meet with representatives from the Directorate of the Displaced, Ministry of Social Affairs, subgrantees of the WRF grant, other non-WRF-affiliated indigenous NGOs, international and U.S. NGOs, and other child-protection and welfare experts, to address the following questions:

- (a) What are the major categories of at-risk children in Lebanon, and what are considered to be the major problems affecting displaced and unaccompanied children today and over the next ten years? What data are there to document these suppositions?
- (b) What are the systemic, legislative or other policy-level issues which, if unaddressed, constitute the greatest constraints to the return to normalization of the nation*s children and youth?
- (c) What successful, local-level initiatives that are addressing serious needs of children might best be replicated and brought to scale?
- (d) Given current data and trends, what might constitute the most effective use of limited USG resources over the next 3-5 years? (i) support for private, NGO, community-specific initiatives; (ii) support for a national ‘body* to develop and implement governmental policies and provide guidance for public and non-governmental sector programs; (iii) a mix of the two, or (iv) some other approach that is especially suitable in the Lebanese context and likely to be effective?
- (e) What is the realistic future goal or niche of nonconfessional, indigenous NGOs working on child welfare in Lebanon?

(7) The consultant is encouraged to brief with USAID and the U.S. Embassy at the beginning of the assessment and, if at all possible, to provide a formal debriefing for the U.S. Ambassador.

(8) A draft report will be submitted to USAID/Washington within ten working days after departure from country.

Annex 2

Program Schedule

- 27.1.97 Travel to Beirut.
Meeting with: **Dr. Nadim Karam**, President, WRF, and **Mr. Toufic Fizekallah**, Director, WRF
- 28.1.97 Meetings with: **Dr. Nadim Karam**, President, WRF
Ms. Dolly Bassil, Program Manager, WRF
Ms. Mona Mahfouz and **Ms. Suzan Hallal**, team members, WRF.
Mrs. Nayla Mouawwad, Chair, Parliamentary Committee on the Rights of the Child, and President, René Mouawwad Foundation; and **Dr. Youssef El-Khalil**, Director, Bank of Lebanon, and staff member, René Mouawwad Foundation.
Ms. Solange Sakr, Sociologist; ex-senior staff member, SESOBEL; Treasurer, Lebanese Hemophilia Association; and Vice President, Defense for Children International
Ms. Eliane Zarifé, ex-senior staff member, AFEL.
Mr. Ghassan Rahal, Micro Credit Program, and Manager, Save the Children USA
- 29.1.97 Meetings with: **Mrs. Nemat Kanaan**, Director General, Ministry of Social Affairs
Mr. Ron L. Schlicher, DCM, US Embassy, and
Mr. Ghassan Jamous, Director, USAID
Pierre Issi, Director, Arc En Ciel
Mr. Kamal Feghali, Director, Project Aidoun, Directorate of the Displaced
- 30.1.97 Meetings with: **Dr. Joseph Haddad**, Operations Director, SESOBEL, and **Ms. Fadia Akl Safi**, Administrative Director, SESOBEL
Mr. Issam Bechara, Director, Pontifical Mission
Mr. Rajan Gill, Country Representative, Save the Children USA, and **Mr. Reda Mainari**, Micro Finance Project Manager, Save the Children USA
Ms. Philippa Neave, Middle East Program Coordinator, Quaker Peace and Service
Mr. Sati' Arnaout, Consultant, EU Environmental Development Program
- 31.1.97 Meetings with: **Ms. Afife el-Sayed**, President, Lebanese Union for Child Welfare, and **13 national NGO Directors**.
Ms. Leila Akoury Dirani, Director, Lebanese Institute

of Educators, St. Joseph University
Ms. Hyam Samaha Kahi, Director, Lebanese School of Social Work Training, St. Joseph University
Father Fouad El-Hage, President, Caritas Lebanon, and Vice President, Caritas International, and three senior staff

1.2.97 Meetings with: **Dr. Moussa Sharafeddine**, President, Friends of the Handicapped Association; President, National Union of the Associations of Parents and Institutions of the Mentally Disabled; Vice President, International League of the Societies for the Mentally Handicapped; and Member, Lebanese Council for the Follow-Up of Learning Disorders

Field visit to: **Dr. Ali El-Zein**, Program Officer for Health, and **Ms. Adèle Khudur**, Project Officer, UNICEF Al-Mabbarat Association Orphanage, Dawha

Meeting with: **Dr. Khodor Dabbous**, President, Al-Mabbarat Association, and senior staff

2.2.97 Field visit to: The Chouf and Mount Lebanon. Visits to several villages of resettled displaced-families, reconstructed villages, and rehabilitated farms. Discussions with groups of young returnees.

Meeting with: **Mr. Walid Attalah**, Socio-Economist, Ministry of Displaced/UNDP
Ms. Brigitte Butel, Delegate, Terre des hommes Foundation

3.2.97 Field visit to: Comprehensive Services Center, Bourj El Barajneh
Meetings with: **Ms. Nadia Tawtal**, Director, Comprehensive Services Center, and Representative, Save the Children UK

Mr. Christian de Klerk, Senior Advisor to the Representative, UNDP
Ms. Randa Abu El Husn, Program Officer, UNDP

4.2.97 Meeting with: **Mr. Ghassan Sayyah**, Director, YMCA, and Vice President, Lebanese NGO Forum

Field visit to: Terre des hommes* Nabaa Physiotherapy Center
Meetings with: **Mr. Thomas Ekvall**, Director General, UNICEF
Mr. John Etre, Director, Schneller Orphanage, and Secretary General, National Council for Social Welfare Services

- Field visit to: Al Amal Youth Center
Meetings with: **Ms. Hoda Kara**, Coordinator, Al Amal Association, and Member, Standing Committee of Associations for Specialized Preventative Services
Mr. Abdul-Hafiz Ladki, Director, Dr. Mohammed Khaled Social Foundations
- 5.2.97 Meeting with: **Ms. Lina Habib**, Coordinator, OXFAM
Field visit to: Roumieh Prison, Youth Section
Meeting with: **Ms. Mayla Bakhache**, Executive Director, 'Mouvement Social*
Professor Mounir Abu Assly, President, Center for Educational Research and Development
Maitre George Assaf, Representative, Defense for Children International; President, Legal Aid Commission; Representative, Human Rights Watch, and Representative, Penal Reform International
- 6.2.97 Meetings with: **Mr. Mohammed Barakat**, President, Social Welfare Institutions; President, National Council for Social Welfare Institutions; and Member, Lebanese NGO Forum
Dr. Ghassan Rabbah, Director, Lebanese Union for the Protection of Juveniles
Dr. Assem Aledmeddine, President, Restart Center, Tripoli; Consultant, First Step Together, Tripoli; and Professor, Psychology Department, Lebanese University, and **Ms. Suzanne Jabbour**, Director, First Step Together, Tripoli; and Director, Friends In Need Association of the Deaf
- Debriefing with: **Mr. James Stephenson**, USAID, **Mr. Ron L. Schlicher**, DCM, American Embassy, and **Mr. Ghassan Jamous**, USAID
- Debriefing with: **WRF staff team**
Meeting with: **Dr. Nadim Karam**, President, WRF
- 7.2.97 Departure from Beirut. Return to France.

Annex 3

List of Acronyms

CBO: Community-based organization

DCOF: Displaced Children and Orphans Fund

NGO: Non-governmental organization

PVO: Private voluntary organization

SESOBEL: Social Services for the Well-Being of the Lebanese Child

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF: United Nations Children*s Funds

USG: United States government

WRF: World Rehabilitation Fund

Annex 4

Information Sources

Lebanon Country Report. The Economist Intelligence Unit.

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The Application of International Human Rights Instruments by the Judiciary in Lebanon. Georges J. Assaf.

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Understanding Street Children. A Profile Assessment in Greater Beirut.
American University of Beirut.

Press records from L'Orient du Jour. (a francophone Lebanese newspaper) on juvenile delinquency in Lebanon.

Lebanon. Carole Cadwalladr and Anna Sutton.

PLO in Lebanon. Dr. Raphael Israeli.

Peace in Galilee.

Pity the Nation. Robert Fisk.

Annex 5

Methodology

The following methodology was used to compile the information in this report:

1. Discussions with displaced youth.
2. Discussions with imprisoned youth.
3. Discussions with children on the street.
4. Study of WRF archive material, project proposals, reports, project descriptions, etc.
5. Study of historical material on social service provision in Lebanon before, during and after the war.
6. Study of WRF subgrantee program material.
7. Meetings with non-WRF-linked NGOs and CBOs.
8. Semi-structured interviews with NGO representatives.
9. Semi-structured interviews with legal experts in the field of children*s rights.
10. Semi-structured interviews with government representatives.
11. Semi-structured interviews with UN agency representatives.
12. Discussions with academics in the fields of social work, education, and the law.
13. Interviews and group discussions with WRF staff members.
14. Briefing discussions with DCOF, Washington DC, and USAID/Lebanon.

No questionnaires were used, but the questioning followed a similar pattern in all cases.

Jeremy Condor, Sospel, February 20th 1996.